Presidential Policy Directive -- United States Conventional Arms Transfer Policy
January 15, 2014
PRESIDENTIAL POLICY DIRECTIVE/PPD-27SUBJECT: United States Conventional Arms Transfer Policy
Conventional weapons have continued to play a decisive
role in armed conflict in the early 21st century and will remain
legitimate instruments for the defense and security policy of
responsible nations for the foreseeable future. In the hands of hostile
or irresponsible state and non-state actors, however, these weapons can
exacerbate international tensions, foster instability, inflict
substantial damage, enable transnational organized crime, and be used to
violate universal human rights. Therefore, global conventional arms
transfer patterns have significant implications for U.S. national
security and foreign policy interests, and the U.S. policy for
conventional arms transfer has an important role in shaping the
international security environment.
United States conventional arms transfer policy supports
transfers that meet legitimate security requirements of our allies and
partners in support of our national security and foreign policy
interests. At the same time, the policy promotes restraint, both by the
United States and other suppliers, in transfers of weapons systems that
may be destabilizing or dangerous to international peace and security.
Goals of U.S. Conventional Arms Transfer Policy
United States conventional arms transfer policy serves the following U.S. national security and foreign policy goals:
- Ensuring U.S. military forces, and those of allies and partners, continue to enjoy technological superiority over potential adversaries.
- Promoting the acquisition of U.S. systems to increase interoperability with allies and partners, lower the unit costs for all, and strengthen the industrial base.
- Enhancing the ability of allies and partners to deter or defend themselves against aggression.
- Encouraging the maintenance and expansion of U.S. security partnerships with those who share our interests, and regional access in areas critical to U.S. interests.
- Promoting regional stability, peaceful conflict resolution, and arms control.
- Preventing the proliferation of conventional weapons that could be used as delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction.
- Promoting cooperative counterterrorism, critical infrastructure protection, and other homeland security priorities.
- Combating transnational organized crime and related threats to national security.
- Supporting democratic governance and other related U.S. foreign policy objectives.
- Ensuring that arms transfers do not contribute to human rights violations or violations of international humanitarian law.
Process and Criteria Guiding U.S. Arms Transfer Decisions
Arms transfer decisions will continue to meet the
requirements of applicable statutes such as the Arms Export Control Act,
the Foreign Assistance Act, the International Emergency Economic Powers
Act, and the annual National Defense Authorization Act, as well as the
requirements of all applicable export control regulations and of U.S.
international commitments.
All arms transfer decisions will be guided by a set of
criteria that maintains the appropriate balance between legitimate arms
transfers to support U.S. national security and that of our allies and
partners, and the need for restraint against the transfer of arms that
would enhance the military capabilities of hostile states, serve to
facilitate human rights abuses or violations of international
humanitarian law, or otherwise undermine international security. This
includes decisions involving the transfer of defense articles, related
technical data, and defense services through direct commercial sales,
government-to-government transfers, transfers of arms pursuant to U.S.
assistance programs, approvals for the retransfer of arms, changes of
end-use, and upgrades. More specifically, all arms transfer decisions
will be consistent with relevant domestic law and international
commitments and obligations, and will take into account the following
criteria:
- Appropriateness of the transfer in responding to legitimate U.S. and recipient security needs.
- Consistency with U.S. regional stability interests, especially when considering transfers involving power projection capability, anti-access and area denial capability, or introduction of a system that may foster increased tension or contribute to an arms race.
- The impact of the proposed transfer on U.S. capabilities and technological advantage, particularly in protecting sensitive software and hardware design, development, manufacturing, and integration knowledge.
- The degree of protection afforded by the recipient country to sensitive technology and potential for unauthorized third-party transfer, as well as in-country diversion to unauthorized uses.
- The risk of revealing system vulnerabilities and adversely affecting U.S. operational capabilities in the event of compromise.
- The risk that significant change in the political or security situation of the recipient country could lead to inappropriate end-use or transfer of defense articles.
- The degree to which the transfer supports U.S. strategic, foreign policy, and defense interests through increased access and influence, allied burden sharing, and interoperability.
- The human rights, democratization, counterterrorism, counterproliferation, and nonproliferation record of the recipient, and the potential for misuse of the export in question.
- The likelihood that the recipient would use the arms to commit human rights abuses or serious violations of international humanitarian law, retransfer the arms to those who would commit human rights abuses or serious violations of international humanitarian law, or identify the United States with human rights abuses or serious violations of international humanitarian law.
- The impact on U.S. industry and the defense industrial base, whether or not the transfer is approved.
- The availability of comparable systems from foreign suppliers.
- The ability of the recipient to field effectively, support, and appropriately employ the requested system in accordance with its intended end-use.
- The risk of adverse economic, political, or social impact within the recipient nation and the degree to which security needs can be addressed by other means.
Supporting Arms Control and Arms Transfer Restraint
A critical element of U.S. conventional arms transfer
policy is to promote control, restraint, and transparency of arms
transfers. The United States will continue its participation in the U.N.
Register of Conventional Arms and the U.N. Standardized Instrument for
Reporting Military Spending, in the absence of an international legally
binding treaty that requires such transparency measures. The United
States will continue to urge universal participation in the U.N.
Register and encourage states reporting to the Register to include
military holdings, procurement through national production, and model or
type information for transfers, thereby providing a more complete
picture of change in a nation's military capabilities each year. The
United States will also continue to examine the scope of items covered
under the Register to ensure it meets current U.S. national security
concerns. Additionally, the United States will support regional
initiatives to enhance transparency in conventional arms.
The United States will continue its participation in the
Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and
Dual-Use Goods and Technologies, which began operations in 1996 and is
designed to prevent destabilizing accumulations of conventional arms and
related dual-use goods and technologies. By encouraging transparency,
consultation, and, where appropriate, national policies of restraint,
the Arrangement fosters greater responsibility and accountability in
transfers of arms and dual-use goods and technologies. We will continue
to use the Wassenaar Arrangement to promote shared national policies of
restraint against the acquisition of armaments and sensitive dual-use
goods and technologies for military end-uses by states whose behavior is
a cause for serious concern.
The United States will also continue vigorous support for
current arms control and confidence-building efforts to constrain the
demand for destabilizing weapons and related technology. The United
States recognizes that such efforts bolster stability in a variety of
ways, ultimately decreasing the demand for arms.
The United States will not authorize any transfer if it
has actual knowledge at the time of authorization that the transferred
arms will be used to commit: genocide; crimes against humanity; grave
breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949; serious violations of Common
Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949; attacks directed against
civilian objects or civilians who are legally protected from attack or
other war crimes as defined in 18 U.S.C. 2441.
Also, the United States will exercise unilateral restraint
in the export of arms in cases where such restraint will be effective
or is necessitated by overriding national interests. Such restraint will
be considered on a case-by-case basis in transfers involving states
whose behavior is a cause for serious concern, where the United States
has a substantial lead in weapon technology, where the United States
restricts exports to preserve its military edge or regional stability,
where the United States has no fielded countermeasures, or where the
transfer of weapons raises concerns about undermining international
peace and security, serious violations of human rights law, including
serious acts of gender-based violence and serious acts of violence
against women and children, serious violations of international
humanitarian law, terrorism, transnational organized crime, or
indiscriminate use.
Finally, the United States will work bilaterally and
multilaterally to assist other suppliers in developing effective export
control mechanisms to support responsible export control policies.
Supporting Responsible U.S. Transfers
The United States Government will provide support for
proposed U.S. exports that are consistent with this policy. This support
will include, as appropriate, such steps as: tasking our overseas
mission personnel to support overseas marketing efforts of U.S.
companies bidding on defense contracts; actively involving senior
government officials in promoting transfers that are of particular
importance to the United States; and supporting official Department of
Defense participation in
international air and trade exhibitions when the Secretary
of Defense, in accordance with existing law, determines such
participation to be in the national interest and notifies the Congress.
The United States will also continue to pursue efforts to streamline
security cooperation with our allies and partners, and in the conduct of
conventional arms transfer policy and security cooperation policy, the
United States Government will take all available steps to hasten the
ultimate provision of conventional arms and security assistance.
This Directive supersedes Presidential Decision Directive/ NSC-34, dated February 10, 1995.
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